It has been claimed that the early-2000s slowdown or hiatus, characterized 23
by a reduced rate of global surface warming, has been overstated, lacks 24 sound scientific basis, or is unsupported by observations. The evidence 25 presented here contradicts these claims. 26
A large body of scientific evidence -amassed before and since the Fifth 27 Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 28 AR5) 1 -indicates that the so-called surface warming "slowdown", also 29 sometimes referred to in the literature as the "hiatus", was due to the combined 30 effects of internal decadal variability and natural forcing (volcanic and solar) 31 2 superimposed on human-caused warming 2 . Given the intense political and public 32 scrutiny that global climate change now receives, it has been imperative for 33 scientists to provide a timely explanation of the warming slowdown, and to place 34 it in the context of ongoing anthropogenic warming. Despite recently voiced 35 concerns we believe this has largely been accomplished. 36 Figure 1 shows annual average anomalies of global mean surface 37 temperature (GMST) in three updated observational datasets [3] [4] [5] , and averaged 38 over 124 simulations from 41 climate models. The observed rate of global 39 surface warming since the turn of this century has been considerably less than 40 the average simulated rate 6 . This mismatch helped to initiate discussion of a 41 warming slowdown in observations. We note that in the multi-model mean, 42 averaging across models damps internal variability, thus providing a less-noisy 43 estimate of the underlying climate response to combined natural (volcanic and 44 solar) and anthropogenic forcing. focused on the role of internal variability; this work built on an extensive body of 49 research into the nature and causes of internal decadal climate variability -50 research that had been actively pursued since the 1990s. Subsequent slowdown 51 studies examined contributions from external forcing and observational 52 uncertainty, as we discuss below. This important historical perspective is missing 53 in recent critiques of research into the slowdown (e.g., Refs 4, 8 and 9). 54
How unusual a period of slowing is depends strongly on its length 10 .
Rates of 55
warming remained slow into the early 2010s, but a warming in 2014 and the 56 record warmth of 2015 illustrate the sensitivity of warming estimates to choice of 57 trend length, starting point, and end point. To illustrate such issues, and to place 58 the slowdown in the context of longer-term trends and variability, we compute 59 overlapping trends using 15-year, 30-year and 50-year windows starting in 1900. 
Scientific advances 74
The initial focus of post-AR5 slowdown research was on explaining why 75 observed and modelled temperature changes differ in the early 21st Century (Fig. 2e) . Since averaging over a large number of 83 climate model simulations reduces the random noise of internal variability, and 84 assuming a large contribution from internal variability in the slowdown, the mean 85 of the multi-model ensemble (MME) could not be expected to reproduce the 86
slowdown. 87
A different perspective on the role of internal variability is obtained through the 88 analysis of the individual models and realizations comprising the MME. In ten out 89 4 of 262 ensemble members, the simulations and observations had the same 90 negative phase of the IPO during the slowdown period -i.e., there was a 91
fortuitous "lining up" of internal decadal variability in the observed climate system 92 and the ten simulations 15, 16 . These ten ensemble members captured the muted 93 early 21st century warming, thus illustrating the role of internal variability in the 94
slowdown. 95
Related work has identified additional contributions to the slowdown from 
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Research has also identified a systematic mismatch during the slowdown 103 between observed volcanic forcing and that used in climate models 19 .
104
It has been suggested 20 that the lack of Arctic surface measurements has 105 resulted in an underestimate of the true rate of GMST increase in the early 21st 106
Century. Independent satellite-based observations 21, 22 of the temperature of the 107 lower troposphere (TLT; Fig. 2f ) have near-global, time-invariant coverage. 108
Although satellite TLT datasets also have important uncertainties 21 , they 109 corroborate the slowdown of GMST increase 23 and provide independent 110 evidence that the slowdown is a real phenomenon. 111
These examples have built upon earlier advances in our scientific 112 understanding of the causes of fluctuations in GMST. For example, the cooling 113 after the Pinatubo eruption in 1991 was predicted before it could be observed. 114
The ability of climate models to simulate this cooling signal was reported in 115 published papers and IPCC assessments. Previous work noted the importance of 116 the "spring-back" from Pinatubo, which contributed to relatively rapid rates of The warming slowdown as a statistically robust phenomenon has also been 165 questioned. Recent studies have assessed whether or not trends during the 166 slowdown are statistically different from trends over some earlier period. These 167 investigations have led to statements such as "further evidence against the 168 notion of a recent warming hiatus" 4 or "claims of a hiatus in global warming lack 169 sound scientific basis" 9 . While these analyses are statistically sound, they 170 benchmark the recent slowdown against a baseline period that includes times 171 with a lower rate of increase in greenhouse forcing 1 , as we discuss below. Our 172 goal here is to move beyond purely statistical aspects of the slowdown, and to 173 focus instead on improving process understanding and assessing whether the 174 observed trends are consistent with our expectations based on climate models. 175
Baseline periods 176
The claim that the slowdown is not manifest in observations 4 is based on 177 comparing recent trends in updated GMST against the GMST trend over a 178 baseline period from 1950 to 1999. Given the variability evident in Fig. 1, it is  179 obvious that the choice of start and end dates will determine the extent to which 180 trends over one interval are larger or smaller than those over another interval (as 181 shown in Ref. 7). A baseline period that includes the big hiatus, during which time 182 positive anthropogenic GHG forcing was weaker than today (and negative forcing 183 from anthropogenic sulphate aerosol emissions was increasing rapidly), will 184 necessarily yield a relatively small baseline GMST trend. Similarly, comparisons 185 can be strongly affected by computing decadal-scale trends over intervals with 186 end dates influenced by large El Niño or La Niña events, or changes in volcanic 187 aerosols. In our opinion, start and end dates should be selected based on 188 physical understanding of the forcings and processes involved. 
218
The big hiatus and warming slowdown periods correspond to times during 219 which the dominant mode of decadal variability in the Pacific -the IPO -was in 220 its negative phase. In the intervening period the IPO was in its positive phase. analysis, which relies on physical understanding of the key processes and 256 forcings involved, we find that the rate of warming over the early 21st Century is 257 slower than that of the previous few decades. This slowdown is evident in time 258
series of GMST and in the global mean temperature of the lower troposphere. 259
The magnitude and statistical significance of observed trends (and the magnitude 260 This has led to widespread recognition that modulation by internal variability is 265 large enough to produce a significantly reduced rate of surface temperature 266 increase for a decade or even more -particularly if internal variability is 267 augmented by the externally driven cooling caused by a succession of volcanic 268 eruptions. The legacy of this new understanding will certainly outlive the current 269 warming slowdown. This is particularly true in the embryonic field of decadal 270 climate prediction, where the challenge is to simulate how the combined effects 271 of external forcing and internal variability produce the time-evolving regional 272 climate we will experience over the next ten years 36 . 273
